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MINNEAPOLIS COURT OF CONCILIATION

THE MINNEAPOLIS COURT OF CONCILIATION IN
OPERATION
THE bill for the act creating the conciliation court of Minneapolis, as drawn up by the special committee of the State
Bar Association appointed for that purpose,' in the form presented to the legislature of 1917, was undoubtedly the most carefully worked out plan yet attempted for transplanting the Norwegian conciliatory procedure' in the settlement of petty disputes to
American soil. It was hardly to be expected that the bill as drawn
would be passed without modification by the legislature. The
idea of adversary procedure as the sole and indispensable method
of administering justice is so deeply ingrained in the legal profession, trained under Anglo-Saxon traditions, that any suggestion that small disputes can be judicially determined by
bringing the parties together through the advice and persuasion of an officer of the law seems not only unpractical, but
even repulsive. The outline plan of the bill as presented is set
forth in an article in I MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW, page 107. The
other small debtors' courts existing in this country are primarily
courts for the expeditious settlement of small disputes by summary procedure of an adversary character. Their conciliation
features are rather incidental and wholly dependent upon the attitude of the judge in the conduct of his court. The State Bar Association's bill, however, boldly proposed that the new court,
which was indeed but a branch of the municipal court, should be
primarily a court of conciliation and only secondarily a small
debtors' court.
With this end in view the bill provided in substance that the
conciliation court should have jurisdiction co-extensive with that
of the municipal court; that as to all causes involving amounts
in excess of $100 application to the court should be purely voluntary and the powers of the court wholly confined to the effort to
bring the parties to agreement; and that causes involving amounts
not exceeding $100 (except actions of unlawful detainer and ac-

I See Minnesota State Bar Association report 1916, p. 256, 1917,
p. 293.
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tions in which the provisional remedy of attachment, replevin or
garnishment was involved in the inception of the action), must be
first brought in the court of conciliation. Of those causes required
to be brought in the conciliation court two classes were made.
Over the first class, involving sums exceeding $50 but not exceeding $100, the court was to have only conciliatory powers. If the
parties could not be brought to agreement and judgment entered
thereon, the case was to be dismissed without prejudice. The
plaintiff; upon exhibiting a certificate showing that the cause had
been before the conciliation court and dismissed, could then
bring his action in such other proper court as he might select. In
the second class of cases, those involving sums not exceeding $50,
the bill gave the court power, in case the parties could not be
brought to agreement, to determine the cause summarily, wih
provision for removal to the regular municipal court in case the
plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial.
The legislature rejected the compulsory conciliation feature.
The act as passed 2 gave the conciliation court jurisdiction co-extensive with that of the municipal court, hut made it wholly optional in all cases whether the plaintiff should bring his case, however small, in the conciliation court or take it directly to the municipal court. The act allowed anyone having a claim within the
jurisdiction of the municipal court to bring it before the conciliation court, but as to causes involving more than $50 thus
optionally brought before the court of conciliation it had only conciliatory powers, and was obliged to dismiss the case without
prejudice if the parties could not be brought to agreement. According to the provisions of the act, the court had the powers of
summary disposition as proposed in the bill over those cases involving not more than $50 which might be optionally brought before it
From this statement it is apparent that the conciliatory features of the original bill were, to a large extent, eliminated from
the act as passed. The result has been to confine the business of
the court almost exclusively to cases involving not more than $50.
A few disputes involving larger sums have been brought before
the court and settled by agreement of the parties, but up to the
present time this voluntary conciliation feature has assumed little
importance.
Despite the mutilated and weakened form in which the act
emerged from the legislature, the success of the court almost from
2

Minnesota Laws 1917, Ch. 263.
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the first day on which it was opened for business has outrun the
expectation even of its most hopeful well-wishers. Quartered ill
a large court room, massively furnished, the court is clothed with
that outer semblance of dignity and authority which undoubtedly
has its influence upon the minds of litigants in reducing to their
proper proportions the petty quarrels which they bring there for
settlement. The judge's chambers, opening into the court room,
are ample, and the office of the clerk is conveniently located
nearby.. The course of procedure, as worked out in practice, is
very much the same as was anticipated. Practically all claims are
filed in the clerk's office where the clerk, himself trained in the law,
is always ready to lend a sympathetic ear to the infinitely varying
stories of mingled wrong, folly and misfortune, and to advise the
complainants what next step they should take, if any, to secure
redress. Many of their complaints are beyond the power of any
court to remedy, and such would-be plaintiffs are advised to go
home and avoid similar mistakes or follies in the future. The
clerk estimates that nearly one thousand complainants have refrained from filing claims upon being advised that they were
clearly entitled to no remedy within the jurisdiction of the court.
The clerk also frequently lends a helping hand when the complainant, as often happens, is too ignorant or inexperienced to fill
out the simple form, stating merely the names and addresses of
the parties, and the nature and amount of the claim, which takes
the place of a declaration or complaint. The clerk then sets a day
for the hearing. This is usually one week distant unless he learns
that an earlier or later day will be more convenient to the parties.
The summons, immediately sent to the defendant, usually by mail,
but sometimes by telephone, notifies him of the filing of the claim
and the day and hour set for the hearing, and informs him that
judgment by default will be entered against him if he does not
appear. The informality in the service of summons does not
work any real injury since the very liberal discretion possessed by
the judge in dealing with defaults enables him to protect defendants in those rare cases in which the mail goes astray. The fee
for setting aside default judgments is rarely taxed.
In those cases where the plaintiff makes a sworn claim that he
has been wrongfully deprived of the possession of personalty, the
judge does not hesitate, where the needs of justice require such
action, without requiring any bond whatever, to send a bailiff to
take possession of the property to await his further order.
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Of the cases thus filed little more than one-half ever come up
tor hearing. The remainder are settled before hearing on the
advice of the clerk or of the judge in chambers, or through the
mere influence of the very harmless-looking summons to appear
in court. Thus of the 3,500 cases disposed of up to April 23rd
last, 1,745 are recorded as settled out of court.
Hearings are now usually set for three days in the week.
When a case is called the parties advance to the bar, removed only
about six feet from the judge's bench. Sometimes they bring
witnesses with them, but usually they do not. From this point
the proceedings are best described by reporting a typical case.
After identifying the parties the judge asks the plaintiff what the
dispute is about, and the following colloquy takes place:
Plaintiff: "Has this fellow got any right to fire me from my
job at the end of the week without notice after I had worked seven
months for him and left a good job to come to him?"
Judge: "Were you hired by the week?"
Plaintiff: "Yes, I was, but I was fired just because he got a
new foreman who didn't like me. I am a good workman and
I've got a right to a week's notice."
Judge: "Did the defendant promise to give you a week's
notice ?"
Plaintiff: "No, not just so, but that was my understanding."
Judge: "Could you have left at the end of a week?"
Plaintiff: "I always give three days' notice before I quit."
The judge then asked the defendant what he had to say about
the matter, and was told that defendant's foreman concluded that
the plaintiff was an unsatisfactory workman ; so he "paid him up
to the end of the week and let him out." The judge then, in
kindly tones, explained to the plaintiff what were his legal rights
under a contract of employment; how he must stipulate for notice
if he wished to have it; and dismissed the parties. The clerk
wrote "dismissed" on the calendar and the case was disposed of,
all in just five minutes.
Something over twenty-five per cent of the cases that come to
a hearing are settled by agreement of the parties upon the advice
of the court, and thus disposed of without judgment. In the
remainder of the cases set for hearing judgments are entered
either after summary trial, or upon default.
Most-of the judgments entered are satisfied by payment to
the clerk or directly to the judgment creditor. Only 83 transcripts of judgments have been issued for docketing in the office
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of the clerk of the municipal court in order to enable the plaintiffs
to sue out writs of execution.
The cases for the most part involve disputes about wages,
rents and small claims of infinitely varying origin. Many of them
are petty, and some are squalid and discreditable, but all of them
are very important to the participants. The greater number of
contested cases turn upon issues of fact, though in some cases
the quarrel is due to different theories of 'the parties as to their
legal rights. In one case at least a litigant with flashing eyes
placed her claim of right to remove furniture from the plaintiff~s
house squarely on the constitution, though she failed to indicate
on what constitution she relied, or what particular provision was
applicable. The non-technical and conciliatory method of disposing of these questions of fact may be best shown by reporting
briefly a typical case.
A prosperous looking man was sued for $7.05, alleged to be
due for work done upon his automobile. The defendant stated
that he had told the plaintiff's foreman to renew the grease in
his machine, while the plaintiff asserted that the defendant had
told the foreman to change the grease and do anything else that
he might find necessary, and that the foreman, finding a certain
spring broken, had replaced it with a new one. The defendant,
with considerable show of indignation, denied authorizing any
work save the greasing. He said he was perfectly willing to pay
for the work he had authorized, but he was fully determined he
would not pay for a job he had never ordered; that he was tired
of having repair men run up bills on him. He.asked that the-case
be continued, and the foreman brought in as a witness. But the
judge thought otherwise. Remarking that it would be a pity to
use up more of the time of useful workmen on such a trifling dispute, by a few brief questions he got the defendant to admit that
the work had been done, that the charge made was not particularly
unreasonable, and that in his opinion the foreman had acted in
good faith in doing the disputed work. "Well," said the judge.
"don't you think you would better pay the whole bill, and waste
no more time over the matter?" A rather sheepish grin spread
over the defendant's face as he replied, "I guess you are right,
Judge," and forthwith paid over the amount.
Another brief report will indicate the court's total disregard
of the formal rules incident to our accustomed adversary procedure. as well as the method of disposing of conflicting testimony as to questions of fact. The plaintiff appeared with-her
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daughter, the desire for combat apparent in every gesture, especially in the forward thrust of her chin. There had evidently been some words between the parties. The belligerent
plaintiff needed no invitation from the judge to tell about the
trouble. In her opinion the defendant was a cheap skate. She
had hired plaintiff's daughter to look after her children, promising to pay her $2.50 a week, but hadn't lived up to her
promise, and now owed plaintiff $14.00, which sum, she
averred, the defendant was trying to beat her out of. The
defendant, a neatly dressed young matron of quiet bearing,
evidently found her part in the trial embarrassing and painful.
She stated that she had hired the daughter at $2.00 a week.
and not $2.50; that she had worked for her seven weeks and
had been paid all that was due her excepting $5.80, which she had
always been ready to pay. Here the daughter broke in to
deny that she had received the amount stated by the defendant,
saying that she had received a smaller sum and had worked
for a longer period. At this point it developed that the
daughter was of full age and that all dealings with reference
to the hiring and payment of wages had been with the daughter. This left the combative mother entirely out of the case.
The judge might have told her as much; he might even have
dismissed the case on the ground that it had been brought by
the wrong plaintiff. But it is very doubtful whether any of
the parties, particularly the mother who wanted to be in the
fight at the finish, would have appreciated the principles of law
that might have justified the judge in so determining the
case, especially in view of the fact that the daughter, according to the mother's frank statement, was not very bright and
had to "have somebody stick up for her." The judge, calmly
ignoring such an irregularity, in his mind substituted the
daughter as the party plaintiff and proceeded to soothe the
belligerent mother and reason with the embarrassed defendant. When finally he said to the defendant, "Since you find
yourself mixed up in this quarrel, don't you think you had
better pay the girl $10.00 and settle the whole matter?", the
defendant acquiesced at once and the parties left the court
room, it is hoped, without any disposition to continue their
quarrel.
Another case will illustrate the curious questions that are
brought before the court and the informal way of dealing with
them. Plaintiff had leased a certain furnished house from
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the defendant. Trouble had arisen in regard to the furniture,
the defendant threatening to remove it. The plaintiff had
then brought an action in the district court and had secured a
judgment declaring that under the lease she was entitled to
possession of the furniture, and an order restraining the defendant from interfering with the plaintiff's possession. The
defendant, however, was convinced that the decision of the
district court was wrong. Acting on this belief she proceeded
to remove the furniture by force. The plaintiff might have instituted contempt proceedings in the district court, but instead
she brought the matter to the court of conciliation. The defendant was highly indignant and demanded that the judge
should read the lease and decide the case in accordance with
justice and 'ight and the terms of the lease, which she insisted the district court had not done. She found it difficult
to accept the principle of res judicata as the judge endeavored to explain it, so he proceeded to enter judgment. The
plaintiff knew the second-hand purchase value of the furniture
in question but did not know what would be its rental value
for the remainder of the term. Having gotten a description
of the furniture the judge, by telephone, called up a person
engaged in the business of selling and renting such furniture,
satisfied himself as to what was its rental value and told the
defendant that she might return the furniture or pay $18.00
as its rental value. She decided that she would return the
furniture, although it was manifest as she left the court room
that she still had no proper appreciation of the doctrine of
res judicata.
A final case may be given as indicating another phase of
the court's work. The plaintiff, a well dressed and rather
kindly looking man, was suing the defendant for $48.00 unpaid
rent. The defendant explained that he had been ill for three
months, that he had not yet fully recovered his strength and
that he had gotten behind with all of his bills and he didn't
see how he could pay the plaintiff's house rent. When questioned by the judge as to whether he had a job, he replied in
discouraged tones that he wasn't strong enough to do heavy
work, that the pay for light work was very small and that it
wouldn't be much use anyhow as his wages would be garnisheed. The judge then proceeded to encourage him to get
the best kind of job he could and to pay off his debts gradually.
He told him that he ought to pay the plaintiff, and that he
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would see that the plaintiff gave him as much time as was
necessary. The defendant said he thought he could pay $10 a
month if he wasn't pushed. The judge, however, told him
that he thought he had better not undertake to pay more than
$8 a month and that he would enter judgment for the $48,
payable at the rate of $8 per month. The plaintiff, who evidently did not enjoy the appearance of being an oppressor of
the poor, readily assented to this arrangement.
The purely conciliatory jurisdiction of the court over causes
involving amounts in excess of $50 has been very little used.
The act permits the written agreements drawn up by the
parties to such causes under the advice of the judge, to be
entered upon the docket as ju(!gments, but in the few cases in
which the judge has been called upon to bring the parties to
agreement, voluntary settlements have been made in accordance with the agreements reached and no judgments whatever
entered. Under the present form of the act it is not to be expected
that many cases involving amounts larger than $50 will be
brought to the court inasmuch as the judge, in such cases, has
no power excepting to give advice, and there is no penalty
whatever put upon either of the parties who refuses to settle
in accordance with the advice of the judge. If the plaintiff
does not like the proposed settlement he can ignore the whole
proceeding and bring his action in the appropriate regular
court. So, if the defendant is unwilling to consent, the plaintiff must then pursue his appropriate remedy in one of tile
regular courts, having his trouble for his pains. In the opinion of the writer the provision contained in the Norwegian law
requiring a plaintiff, before bringing in a regular court an
action that could have been settled in the court of conciliation.
to produce a certificate that he had 'unsuccessfully attempted
there to settle it, would result in greatly increasing the number of causes settled by conciliation rather than by the expensive and irritating method of adversary procedure.
The lawyer reading the outlined reports of the typical cases
given above may be'disposed to say that it is a very rough
sort of justice that is administered, and that such jugtice is
dear even at the very low cost entailed by procedure in this
court. But it is very evident that the litigants do not entertain any such opinion. In nearly one-half of the 3,500 cases
disposed of by the court of conciliation, judgments were entered. In fewer than fifty of these cases was there any ex-
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pression of dissatisfaction, and only 8 of them were removed
to the municipal court for jury trials.
The fact that the court of conciliation is absolutely free to
all complainants naturally made it appear as an attractive
agency for the collection of small claims to public utility companies and other concerns that have a large number of customers and a proportionately large number of small claims.
Thus upon the establishment of the court the telephone companies, the gas and electric companies, some of the commission merchants and others expressed their intention of dumping all of their small claims into this court for collection without cost. But a rule prohibiting any single plaintiff from filing more than three suits in any month very promptly checked
this flood and preserved the court's time and energy for the
kind of litigation for which it was intended, that is, the petty
causes of the poorer citizens of the community which could
not economically sustain the heavy cost incident to adversary proceedings in our regular courts.
It is obvious that the success of such a court as the Minneapolis court of conciliation depends almost entirely upon the
qualifications of the judge. The Minneapolis court has been
very fortunate in the appointment of Hon. Thomas W. Salmon
Judge Salmon's courtesy and patience, his
as its first judge.
kindly manner and deep sympathy with the misfortunes of the
poor, his tact and sound judgment, have enabled him to carry
on this kind of judicial work, so new and untried in this country;
with gratifying success. Certainly the reproach that justice is
only for the rich and prosperous is taken away from the city of
Minneapolis.
It is to be hoped that in clue course of time the legislature
may be induced, by amendment ofthe existing act, to adopt
the plan included in the State Bar Association's bill requiring
all litigants making claims not exceedingc$100 to bring them
first before the court of conciliation, giving to that court the
opportunity to bring the parties to an agreement without prejudice to their right to take their causes elsewhere in case of
failure to agree. The operation of the court under the present
act gives every reason to expect that.in a large majority of
the cases thus brought up for conciliation agreements would
be reached at a very great saving of time to the litigants and
W. R. VANCE.
of expense to the state.
UNIVSRITv OF MINNESOTA.

